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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper empirically tests the role of search frictions in driving qualification mismatches in the labor 
market. Using new data from several low-income economies in urban Asia we find that overeducation 
in less developed labor markets are more pervasive than in more developed economies.  Moreover, 
frictions related to search costs are a crucial determinant of match quality resulting in socially 
inefficient talent misallocation. Our findings suggest scope for policy interventions that improve 
worker-job matches with potential gains to wages and aggregate productivity. 
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 I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Mismatches between the skills that workers possess and what jobs require can have negative 
ramifications on productivity and social welfare (Acemoglu and Zilbotti 2001, Hsieh et al. 2013, Lise 
and Postel-Vinay 2015).  For workers, mismatches can limit career progression and the skills that are 
developed on-the-job negatively impacting lifetime earnings (Baert, Cockx, and Verhaest 2013; 
Rogerson et al. 2005; Clark, Joubert, and Maurel 2014).  Given the consequences of mismatches, 
identifying the factors affecting match quality is fundamentally important to determining the right 
types of policy interventions that can improve the matching process.  
 
This paper examines the extent to which various factors explains talent misallocation in the form 
of qualification mismatches across six urban developing Asian economies using the World Bank’s Skills 
towards Employability and Productivity (STEP) Skills Measurement Survey. In our model, match quality 
is defined based on a worker’s perceptions about the level of education needed for the job in which he or 
she is employed compared to the education they possess.  This potentially circumvents the issue of 
within-occupation job heterogeneity, which is not accounted for in alternative (e.g., statistical, 
normative) methods of determining qualification mismatches (e.g., Quinn and Rubb 2006).1  Using a 
multinomial logistic model, we show that search frictions are a significant determinant of match quality 
even after inclusion of rich controls for human capital and local labor market conditions.  Search frictions 
are found to operate through both the channel of informational asymmetries and credit constraints that 
impede poor households from investing significantly in the process of job search.  This leads to poor 
households being far more likely to end up in jobs for which they are overqualified.  While noncognitive 
and cognitive skills possessed by workers have been hypothesized to drive some of the observed 
mismatches, they appear to only play a relatively small role in the developing country context. 
 
While observed mismatch could be driven by structural issues where equilibrium supply of skilled 
labor is insufficient to meet skilled labor demands, we find no evidence that this is the case.  In fact, we 
find that similar to developed countries there are far larger shares of workers that have an education level 
that is greater than the jobs that are available.  In developing Asia, this appears to be driven in part by 
weak labor market demand and could imply a greater role for policies that develop incentives for firms to 
employ higher skilled labor as opposed to greater investments and reforms to education (Lazear and 
Spletzer 2012, McGuinness 2006, Freeman 1976).  While heterogeneous preferences could lead equally 
able and educated workers to choose occupations of dissimilar qualification (e.g., Gottschalk and Hansen 
2003, Groh et al. 2015), or choose not to work at all, this seems less likely to be a factor in driving the 
disproportionately higher levels of overqualification mismatch among poorer populations. 
 
To the best of our knowledge this is one of the first papers to empirically test a large set of 
factors influencing match quality in the context of developing countries.  This is potentially an 
important omission from the literature as search frictions and lower reservation wages exacerbated by 
an absence of unemployment insurance among poor populations are hypothesized to be a significant 
determinant of the much larger informal sector that characterizes developing countries (Satchi and 
Temple 2009).  Our empirical findings suggest that higher search costs and lower reservation wages 
likely arising from credit constraints among those with lower socioeconomic status drives this 
population set to enter less desirable informal sector jobs rather than to remain unemployed.  While in 
developed countries the unemployed are more often both poor and less skilled, those who remain 
                                                            
1  Mehta et al. (2011) find significant returns to education even in very narrow occupations this suggests that using a 
measure of overqualification mismatch based on mean or modal years in an occupation could significantly overestimate 
the level of overqualification in an economy. 
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unemployed in developing countries tend to be those that can afford to keep searching for a job that is 
better matched. This suggests an important role for policy to alleviate some of these distortions in job 
search and matching behavior that persist in developing countries due to search costs and 
socioeconomic status rather than innate skills (Card, Chetty, and Weber 2007). 
 
Simple simulations suggest that reducing search costs and alleviating credit constraints could 
potentially improve the share of job-worker matches by as much as one-third.  However, as better-off 
workers tend to have higher reservation wages, improvements could come at the cost of higher 
unemployment.  In general, our findings are consistent with the literature that finds small subsidies for 
transport or to submit job applications can increase job-search intensity and ultimately facilitate 
greater job matches among poorer populations that face higher search costs (Bangladesh: Bryan, 
Chowdhury, and Mobarak 2014; US: Philips 2014; Ethiopia: Franklin 2015). 
 
The economic consequences of search costs are potentially significant.  Consistent with the 
existing literature, we find that those who are overqualified have higher wage returns compared to 
those in similar jobs that have the required level of education, but lower wages compared to similarly 
educated workers that are well matched (Allen and van der Velden 2001, Quinn and Rubb 2006).  
This contrasts with those that are underqualified having higher wage returns compared to workers with 
similar levels of education, but lower wage returns compared to those with required levels of education 
for which they are well matched (Leuven and Oosterbeek 2011).  However, search frictions only weakly 
explain differences in returns to over and underqualification.  This implies that improving search 
frictions would improve allocation of labor, but is unlikely to affect average levels of employment or 
wages except through the matching process.  Ultimately, total gains to improved labor allocation will 
be bounded by the demand for skills in the labor market.  Nevertheless, reducing search frictions, that 
are prominent among poorer populations and have long-term detrimental consequences on lifetime 
economic returns, could have a significant role in contributing to greater socioeconomic mobility and 
poverty reduction in developing countries. 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section II, we describe our data and its relevant 
features, as well as analyze patterns in the incidence of mismatch in our sample. In section III, we 
provide empirical evidence that barriers to search affect the likelihood of worker-job mismatch. In 
section IV, we examine the link between wages, search, and mismatch. Finally, section V concludes 
with some prospects for interpretation, policy, and future work. 
 
 
II. DATA 
 
A. The Skills towards Employability and Productivity Skills Measurement Surveys 
 
The STEP Skills Measurement Program by the World Bank developed survey instruments tailored to 
collect data on skills in low- and middle-income country contexts. (Pierre et al. 2014) This includes 
information on educational attainment, job characteristics, and socioeconomic background. The 
samples per country comprise approximately 3,000 adults between the age of 15 and 64.  
 
We focus on a subset of countries for which there is data available: Armenia, the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) (Yunnan), Georgia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), Sri 
Lanka, and Viet Nam. The years of data collection are 2012 for the PRC (Yunnan), the Lao PDR, Sri 
Lanka, and Viet Nam; and 2013 for Armenia and Georgia. The target population of the surveys varies 
from one country to another. Armenia and Georgia samples only individuals in urban areas of the 
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country excluding regions experiencing conflict. On the other hand, the Lao PDR and Sri Lanka target 
both urban and rural areas of the country. The sample from Viet Nam is collected from urban areas in 
Ha Noi and Ho Chi Minh City. Meanwhile, the target population for the PRC (Yunnan) is limited to the 
urban areas of Kunming, the largest city in the province of Yunnan. We restrict our analyses to the 
urban, nonmilitary active labor force residing in these areas due to distinct differences in labor markets 
between urban and rural sectors and as a rural subsample is not available for many of the country 
datasets. As the countries are analyzed under a single framework, we apply population weights 
representing the urban areas covered by the surveys, and wage rates are converted into dollars using 
purchasing power parities (PPPs). 
 
Similar to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Survey of 
Adult Skills (PIAAC), the STEP survey offers a unique opportunity to study the stock and use of human 
capital in less developed economies where data of this kind tend to be a rarity. Apart from information 
on years of education, employment, and demographic characteristics, we also utilize measures of 
cognitive reading ability, socioemotional skills, and information on tasks on the job. Of specific 
relevance to our study is a question on the worker’s assessment of the educational attainment required 
for his job. 
 
The countries covered by the data comprise a diverse set of developing Asian economies.  
Both the PRC (Yunnan) and Viet Nam are economies that have rapidly modernized over the past few 
decades evolving from centrally planned to market economies.  While they have started from a 
relatively low base of education and skills, they have been steadily increasing their investments to meet 
their ambitions of moving up the global value chain.  In contrast, Armenia and Georgia have been 
struggling to modernize and transition to a market economy despite having some of the highest levels 
of tertiary educated workers in the region.  In contrast to the PRC and Viet Nam, their labor markets 
are characterized by much higher levels of unemployment and greater levels of formalization.  In 
contrast, both Sri Lanka and the Lao PDR are the poorest of the six economies and remain largely 
agrarian.  These economies have been struggling to industrialize and have far fewer tertiary educated 
workers. We find that these features of the labor market and macroeconomy interact with supply to 
determine equilibrium match outcomes. 
 
B. Summary Statistics 
 
A summary of key variables describing our sample is presented in Table 1. The combined sample size of 
7,720 comprises individuals who are active in the labor force and with different educational and 
professional attainment. 
 
To measure years of education acquired, we use the theoretical years possessed by a worker 
who has finished a given level of formal schooling. Meanwhile, to identify required schooling, we use 
the respondent’s answer to the question, “What do you think is the minimum level of formal 
education that would be required before someone would be able to carry out this work?” To map 
levels to years of education, we follow the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) 1997  crosswalk.  
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Table 1: Summary Statistics–Sample of Active in the Labor Force in Urban Areas (15–64 years old) 
 
 Pooled Armenia PRC (Yunnan) Georgia Lao PDR Sri Lanka Viet Nam
Years of education acquired 11.84 13.13 12.68 14.99 9.53 10.90 11.33
(4.16) (2.70) (3.52) (2.80) (5.17) (3.38) (4.41)
Years of education neededa 10.42 12.72 11.69 14.09 8.19 10.58 9.58
(4.79) (4.43) (3.46) (3.62) (5.57) (3.63) (5.17)
% Mismatch incidence using difference bet. 
years of education required and possessed:        
Well matched 37.0 23.3 46.4 25.6 33.2 43.7 35.6
Overqualified 38.6 21.5 37.9 22.9 42.9 28.2 46.4
Underqualified 14.6 17.2 10.9 5.2 22.1 21.8 14.4
Unemployed 9.7 38.0 4.8 46.3 1.9 6.3 3.6
Mean age 38.95 39.02 39.40 38.85 36.46 38.61 39.17
% Female in population 53.35 63.05 46.79 62.08 56.61 39.13 56.85
% Socioeconomic status at age 15: 
Low income 26.40 8.43 28.19 8.04 30.31 22.03 31.99
Middle income 60.14 49.12 60.92 51.45 61.36 66.24 60.99
High income 13.46 42.44 10.89 40.50 8.33 11.74 7.02
% Share reporting search difficulty due to: 
Lack of access to information on vacancies 23.77 18.13 30.05 16.13 50.33 16.63 21.67
Difficulty in application-related processes 27.90 13.35 39.39 25.36 38.66 19.02 26.57
Difficulty certifying one’s ability 35.47 13.34 44.67 20.33 53.46 24.45 37.97
Lack of work experience 25.13 21.20 24.20 24.21 42.14 12.63 27.54
% Share of employment by sector:a 
Formal wageworker 41.76 81.19 51.41 38.99 17.95 37.52 38.33
Informal wageworker 25.17 8.68 33.34 48.11 26.53 24.34 21.22
Self-employed 33.08 10.13 15.25 12.90 55.51 38.14 40.45
% Share of employment by occupation:a 
High-skill white collar 30.12 51.91 26.55 54.29 23.82 34.06 27.54
Low-skill white collar 38.72 26.23 46.84 24.40 32.18 25.98 69.07
Crafts and related trade worker 19.02 13.64 13.46 12.22 13.12 26.50 21.25
Elementary and skilled agricultural worker 12.14 8.21 13.13 9.09 30.89 13.46 9.68
Log (ln) hourly wage in PPPa 0.90
(0.98) 
0.98
(0.76) 
0.96
(0.74) 
1.08
(0.84) 
0.36
(1.24) 
0.98
(1.02) 
0.91
(1.04) 
Observations (n) 7,720         1,392          1,259            1,383            973            563          2,142
Lao PDR = Lao People’s Democratic Republic, PPP = purchasing power parity, PRC = People’s Republic of China, STEP = Skills towards Employability and Productivity. 
a Derived from subsample of employed individuals. 
Notes: Weighted sample shares are as follows: Armenia 6.96, the PRC (Yunnan) 20.19, Georgia 7.52, the Lao PDR 5.98, Sri Lanka 12.88, and Viet Nam 46.47. Share of jobs by education required uses 
supplied assessment by workers.  Standard deviation in parentheses. Occupation categories are based on reduced groups of the International Standard Classification of Occupations 2008. Managers, 
professionals, and associate professionals make up the high-skilled or high-skill white collar occupations. Low-skill white collar occupations include clerical support workers and service and sales 
workers. Crafts and related trade workers also include plant operators and assemblers. Finally, agricultural workers and elementary occupations make up the last group. 
Source: Authors’ estimates based on World Bank STEP surveys. 
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The use of direct assessment presents a clear methodological advantage and novelty in measuring the 
education needed by occupations in developing economies.2 We find that for all countries, the 
schooling acquired by the working population in the aggregate always exceeds years needed. 
 
Figure 1 depicts this comparison between the skill distribution in every country and worker-
assessed skill demands. The former is based on the sample of employed and unemployed, while the 
latter is based on information provided by employed individuals about their jobs. For illustrative 
purposes, education in this figure is grouped into primary or less (ISCED 1 or less), lower secondary 
(ISCED 2), upper secondary (ISCED 3 and 4), and tertiary (ISCED 5 or higher). On the supply side, we 
find that Central Asian countries Armenia and Georgia feature a well-educated labor force with above 
60% of the active workforce possessing tertiary qualifications. This level of education attainment is 
comparable with those in advanced economies. Meanwhile in the PRC (Yunnan), Sri Lanka, and Viet 
Nam, more than 80% of workers have completed at least lower secondary school. In contrast in the 
Lao PDR, more than a third of the labor force possesses only primary school qualifications or less. 
 
Figure 1: Distribution of Education Acquired and Required by ISCED Levels 
 
 
 
ARM = Armenia, GEO = Georgia, ISCED = International Standard Classification of Education, LAO = Lao People’s Democratic Republic, 
PRC = People’s Republic of China, SRI = Sri Lanka, VIE = Viet Nam. 
Note: Shares of required schooling total to 1 minus unemployment rate. 
Sources: Skills towards Employability and Productivity (STEP); authors’ computations. 
                                                            
2  Previous studies have often relied on mean or modal completed schooling levels of workers in the same occupation as a 
measure of required schooling. As Leuven and Oosterbeek (2011) reason, use of this approach is often regarded as inferior 
as realized matches are the result of demand and supply forces. This approach will tend to overstate (understate) required 
education where overqualification (underqualification) is pervasive. Mismeasurement is also likely to worsen with smaller 
sample sizes and larger variance of job requirements within occupations as is likely the case in segmented labor markets in 
low-income nations.  
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In Table 1, we also report the incidence of mismatch for the pooled sample and across 
countries. We define overeducation (undereducation) as having completed years of schooling above 
(below) what is needed for the job. Among the six, urban Viet Nam has the highest share of individuals 
working in jobs for which they are overqualified. Underqualification is most prevalent in Armenia, 
where 29.1% lack years of schooling that meet job requirements. On the other hand, we find that 
overqualification is more acute in less developed Asian labor markets relative to its incidence in the 
United States (US), where the rate of overqualification measured using worker assessment stands at 
29%.3 The incidence of underqualification is lower for our sample of countries, at 11.6%, compared with 
the 16% reported in the US.  
 
The prevalence of overqualification in developing Asia does not necessarily convey that the 
stock of skills is adequate to address current requirements much less those of the future.  Indeed the 
problem of mismatch is concerned with the balance of supply and demand as well as the efficiency of 
the labor market matching the two (Shimer and Smith 2000, Shimer 2005, Shimer 2007). Moreover, 
there are substantial heterogeneities in jobs and skills that underlie this. In developing Asia, we find 
that employment belongs primarily to informal wage work or self-employed sectors with the exception 
of Armenia. Consistent with a segmented or dual labor market theory, studies have found that 
employment in these sectors largely comprise jobs with low wages and skill requirements (e.g., Fields 
1975, Gunther and Launov 2012). In terms of occupations, relatively high-skilled countries like 
Armenia and Georgia have greater proportions of high-skilled white collar occupations. In other 
countries, the bulk of workers are in low-skill white collar occupations, crafts and related trade, and 
agricultural or elementary occupations.4  
 
Realized matches between job and worker in the cross-section may also reflect search 
inefficiencies that give rise to inefficient investments in education or a misallocation of existing labor. 
For instance, the prevalence of asymmetric information, such as from difficulty demonstrating one’s 
abilities, may cause workers to invest in greater amounts of education to signal their quality even while 
further schooling may provide little value in enhancing their productivity for the jobs available thus 
leading to a prevalence of overqualified workers (Spence, 1973). Alternatively, workers may encounter 
difficulties finding jobs for which their set of skills is appropriate because of limited networks or lack of 
knowledge even while they have the right skills and qualifications.  
 
To proxy for these search frictions, we use survey instruments that ask the respondent, “If you 
were in the position that you were looking for work, do you think you have the means to find out about 
job vacancies?” A similar question is also asked regarding the respondent’s ability to prepare a resume, 
fill out job applications, and perform job interviews, as well as the respondent’s means to certify or 
demonstrate qualifications. We construct three variables that correspond to a negative response to 
these queries: an indicator for difficulty in finding vacancies, an indicator for difficulty navigating the 
job application process, and an indicator for difficulty certifying one’s credentials. The share of workers 
in our sample reporting such problems are 24%, 28%, and 35% respectively.  
 
 
                                                            
3  The incidence of overqualification (underqualification) is also higher (lower) in our sample of Asian countries than the 
OECD, which is at 21% (11.6%) according to a comparison of education levels attained and required (OECD 2013). 
4  These occupation classifications are reduced categories of ISCO-08 codes. Managers, professionals, and associate 
professionals make up the high-skilled or high-skill white collar occupations. Low-skill white collar occupations comprise 
clerical support workers and service and sales workers. Crafts and related trade workers also include plant operators and 
assemblers. Finally, agricultural workers and elementary occupations make up the final group. 
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C. Patterns of Mismatch in Developing Asia 
 
In Table 2, we compare the distribution of mismatch across demographic, sectoral, and occupational 
lines. We find that women are 4 percentage points more likely to be overqualified, while men are 
slightly more likely to be matched or underqualified. Moreover, we find that overqualification tends to 
be more common among midcareer workers, which contrasts with developed countries where the 
incidence of reported overqualification is more prominent among younger workers. Many young 
workers may enter jobs for which they are overqualified and where present returns are lower if it allows 
them to gain important skills resulting in higher probabilities of promotion later (Sicherman and Galor 
1990, Altonji and Pierret 2001). In contrast, underqualification is more prevalent among workers 
approaching retirement, which could be consistent with rising education levels and changing job 
expectations in developing countries. However, there is evidence that younger workers 
disproportionately face greater challenges in finding a job match as they have disproportionately higher 
levels of unemployment. This could arise from greater difficulties in signaling their ability, lack of 
information or experience with job search. Unrealistic expectations about the type of jobs that they 
can obtain given their education, skills, and experience could also play a role. 
 
Table 2: Distribution of Education Mismatch by Sector, Pooled Sample of Active in Labor Force 
 
 Education–Job Match
 Well Matched Overqualified Underqualified Unemployed
Female 35.44 40.39 13.34 10.83
Male 38.89 36.63 16.05 8.43
Early career (15–25 years old) 34.04 31.92 11.26 22.77
Midcareer (26–54 years old) 38.06 40.17 14.39 7.38
Late career (55–64 years old) 34.16 37.15 20.63 8.06
Primary or less (<=ISCED 1) 31.82 33.44 32.01 2.73
Lower secondary (ISCED 2) 38.37 38.36 17.59 5.68
Upper secondary (ISCED 3–4) 40.26 33.79 13.61 12.34
Postsecondary (>=ISCED 5) 35.05 46.31 6.06 12.58
Low SES at age 15 35.73 42.71 16.25 4.81
Middle SES at age 15 37.71 38.85 14.42 9.01
High SES at age 15 36.76 29.52 11.29 22.42
Formal wageworker 46.79 37.35 15.86 
Informal wageworker 41.51 42.04 16.45 
Self-employed 33.41 50.23 16.36 
ISCED = International Standard Classification for Education, SES = socioeconomic status, STEP = Skills towards Employability and 
Productivity. 
Source: Authors’ estimates based on World Bank STEP surveys. 
 
We also find that those from economically disadvantaged backgrounds that had low and 
middle socioeconomic status at age 15 are much more prone to being overqualified. This gives strong 
credence to the claim that credit and informational constraints could potentially be impeding job 
search especially in developing country economies where unemployment insurance is absent.  This 
potentially is reflected in the finding that those that are economically disadvantaged are far less likely 
to be unemployed.  This particular feature of developing country economies could result in less than 
optimal match outcomes in the labor market especially as those that are more credit constrained may 
be less likely to continue to search for a better job due to perceived costs of undertaking job search and 
the need to more immediately generate a source of income (Card, Chetty, and Weber 2007). 
 
Comparing across skill levels, we observe that those with an upper secondary degree are more 
likely to find jobs for which their qualifications are well suited. Meanwhile, those finishing with a tertiary 
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degree are more likely to report being overqualified suggesting they are performing tasks in their jobs 
that do not require a tertiary education. 
 
As emphasized, labor markets in developing countries are unique for their large shares of 
informal sector employment. This sector is comprised largely by either microenterprises or menial 
wage work, which often do not require high levels of skill or training. We find that the more competitive 
formal wage sector better matches workers to jobs than the informal salaried and self-employed 
sectors. In fact, overeducation is particularly severe among self-employed workers. This is plausibly 
explained by the preponderance of small businesses with low skill requirements.5 
 
D. Measured Ability: Cognitive Reading Skills, Noncognitive Skills, and Reported Skill 
Deficiencies 
 
Our dataset contains detailed information on the stock of human capital possessed by the worker. 
Aside from years of education and experience as proxied by age, STEP also includes measures of hard 
and soft skills, as well as self-reported skill deficits in experience, reading skills, and computer 
knowhow. To measure cognitive reading ability, STEP conducts an assessment through a review of 
three cognitive reading operations: access and identify, integrate and interpret, evaluate and reflect. 
Cognitive skills have been defined as the ability to understand complex ideas, adapt effectively to the 
environment, to learn from experience, to engage in various forms of reasoning, and to overcome 
obstacles through problem solving (Neisser et al. 1996). The test contains four sections: vocabulary, 
sentence processing, passage comprehension as well as a core literacy assessment. The last of which is 
used to screen respondents for eligibility to take a second, more difficult battery of exercises. Because 
not all countries are able to conduct this second round of literacy assessment, we construct our 
measure of cognitive literacy skills around the four components mentioned above using information 
on the number of correct answers. This comes at the expense of having smaller variations in measured 
skills as many individuals perform well in these components. To compute our cognitive reading ability 
score, we divide the number of correct answers by the number of items in each component. A simple 
average of these computed scores yields one’s cognitive literacy score. 
 
Socioemotional or character skills are measured through eight emotional, personality, and 
attitudinal traits, each scaled from 1–4 with 4 being the highest or most desirable. These include 
conscientiousness, openness to experience, stability, agreeableness, extraversion, hostile attribution 
bias (reversed), grit, and decision making.6 Because these traits correlate differently with various labor 
market outcomes across countries (e.g., grit is more correlated with wages in Viet Nam, while openness 
to experience is more correlated with wages in the PRC) and our purpose is to measure overall levels of 
noncognitive skills rather than identify the effect of each individual trait, we construct a simple 
measure of noncognitive ability by summing the eight variables and dividing this sum by the highest 
possible score of 32. Both cognitive and noncognitive skill measures are then normalized to have zero 
                                                            
5  While the self-employed may be able to choose more challenging occupations that have higher returns, capital 
constraints, lack of entrepreneurial skills, and market demand may prevent these individuals from pursuing these types of 
occupations. 
6  Conscientiousness has been defined as the propensity to be goal directed and follow norms and rules. Openness to 
experience refers to enjoyment of learning. Stability relates with one’s disinclination to feel negative emotions. 
Agreeableness refers to prosocial orientation with peers, while extraversion relates with sociability. These five comprise 
the Big Five taxonomy or domains of human personality. Moreover, grit relates with perseverance for long-term goals. 
Hostile attribution bias has been defined as the tendency to interpret others’ behaviors or actions as hostile. Finally, 
decision making relates with due diligence taken prior to reaching a decision. The addition of the latter three to the Big 
Five provides incremental predictive power over measures of professional and educational achievement (Pierre et al. 
2014). 
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mean and unit standard deviation within countries. We find the choice of within and cross-country 
standardization does not materially change our results.  
 
Finally, we also utilize information on reported deficiencies in literacy, computer skills, and 
work experience. The first two are dummies from responding affirmatively to the question, “Has a lack 
of reading and writing skills (computer skills) ever kept you from getting a job, a promotion, or a pay 
rise, or held you back from advancing your business or you own account activity?” The latter refers to a 
dummy for an affirmative response to a question asking whether lack of experience would be an 
impediment if the person had been searching for a job today. 
 
 
III. THE ROLE OF SEARCH: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
 
A. Empirical Strategy  
 
High search costs and credit constraints can play an important role in driving worker-job mismatch.  
Worker search costs can generate substantial talent misallocation resulting in workers’ not realizing 
their first best job prospects or alternatively not obtaining a job at all (Pissarides 1979, Pissarides 1984). 
In this section, we examine whether this holds true empirically. 
 
To do this, we model the likelihood of over and underqualification using a multinomial logistic 
(MNL) model. Previous studies predominantly use probit or similar binary outcome models to identify 
the determinants of worker-job match, either by cutting out the subsample of workers not being 
modeled (e.g., perform a probit to estimate odds of overqualification relative to appropriate matching 
by excluding underqualified individuals from the sample) (Quintini 2011) or by treating the nature of 
mismatch as the same (e.g., perform a probit to estimate odds of being mismatched versus 
appropriately matched) (Robst 2007, Green and McIntosh 2007). Chevalier (2003) and Chevalier 
and Lindley (2009) form a small minority that has utilized polychotomous outcome models.7  
 
Our empirical model estimates the likelihood of an individual landing a job of match type k 
conditional on an individual’s endowments and local labor market conditions. This is expressed by the 
model:  
 
Prሺܯܽݐ݄ܿ௜ ൌ ݇ሻ ൌ 	Λሺ ௜ܵ′ߙ௞ ൅ ௜ܺ′ߚ௞ ൅ ௝ܼ′ߛ௞ ൅ ߜ௖ሻ	൥ͩ ൅ 	෍Λሺ ௜ܵ′ߙ௞ ൅ ௜ܺ′ߚ௞ ൅ ௝ܼ′ߛ௞ ൅ ߜ௖ሻ
ͬ
௞ୀͪ
൩
ିͩ
 
 
where k = 1, 2, 3, 4 are match outcomes corresponding with well matched, underqualification, 
overqualification, and unemployed, respectively.  The model originates from a random utility 
framework in which individual i optimally chooses alternative k. The systematic component of utility is 
comprised of the relevant search variables Si, human capital and socioeconomic characteristics of the 
worker Xi, features of the local labor market j denoted by Zj , and a set of country dummies δc. We 
assume that the unobserved component of the utility follows a Type-I extreme value distribution. To 
identify the alternative-specific parameters αk, βk, and γk, we set the parameters of the reference 
                                                            
7  Robst (2007) estimates determinants of the relatedness of field of training to job rather than level of education. Chevalier 
(2003) and Chevalier and Lindley (2009) estimate the probability of being genuinely and apparently overeducated versus 
being in a graduate job.  
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category k = 1 to 0. In effect, we are able to estimate the relative odds of being overqualified, 
underqualified or unemployed to being appropriately matched.  
 
The choice of MNL over binary outcome models may be informationally more efficient and 
does not assume that the underlying causes of unemployment, underqualification and 
overqualification are the same. Thus the sign and magnitude of our parameter of interest, αk, may differ 
depending on match outcome k. We hypothesize that higher search costs increase the odds of 
overqualification and decrease the likelihood of underqualification.  
 
In addition, we also expect a statistically significant relationship between the match outcome and 
socioeconomic status at age 15, which captures a mixture of both credit constraints and higher search 
costs.  Socioeconomic background could relate to the ease at which one obtains a job due to family or 
social connections or geographic location.  While socioeconomic background could also be capturing the 
quality of education, our ability to control for an individual’s current skills provides us with greater 
confidence that the variables contained in our model are more likely capturing factors related to search 
and informational costs and credit constraints. Those from more disadvantaged backgrounds tend to 
have higher search costs as they tend to be geographically further away from the primary labor markets 
and face greater informational constraints due to lack of connections (Calvo-Armengol and Jackson 
2007). Individuals from better economic backgrounds should find it easier to find a job for which they 
are well matched as they are more easily able to smooth their consumption and delay entering a job that 
they find is a suboptimal match. Based on descriptive statistics, we find that those from economically 
poorer families and that have less educated parents are disproportionately more prone to report 
difficulties finding employment and are much more likely to be informally employed. Thus, we include 
marital status, presence of children, the numbers of older and younger siblings, parents’ education, and 
dummies for the worker’s economic status at age 15 in the MNL.  
 
The MNL still poses nontrivial challenges in identifying causal estimates of our main variables 
of interest. Not only are we unable to address specification error using instrumental variables, but it is 
also more difficult to identify the direction of the bias (Lee 1982). 8 A large part of the reason is that we 
are unable to observe and control for many of the firm characteristics that drive the match to arise in 
the first place.  This is a potentially important source of omitted variable bias, which would be 
addressed only in an experimental setting that randomly assigns workers of similar qualifications to 
particular types of jobs. To alleviate some of these concerns, we test several specifications and the 
sensitivity of our results to controls for likely sources of bias by including a battery of job 
characteristics. 
 
Our rich controls for both cognitive and noncognitive skills allow us to address possible issues 
of endogeneity arising from unobserved differences in human capital. Ability differences may lead 
workers to jobs for which they are overqualified (underqualified) if surplus (deficit) schooling 
compensates for (is compensated by) deficiencies (excesses) in their human capital bundle. For 
instance, firms may require additional years of education to substitute for lack of experience or 
language proficiency. To limit bias arising from unobserved skill heterogeneity, we include a host of 
variables that proxy for human capital characteristics such as years of education completed, age, 
tenure, and measures of cognitive reading ability. We additionally control for overall levels of 
noncognitive ability. This is crucial as noncognitive skills have been found to strongly influence 
                                                            
8  Under certain assumptions, Lee (1982) shows that a necessary and sufficient condition for the coefficient of the included 
explanatory variable to be unbiased is that the omitted and included explanatory variables are independent, conditional 
on the outcome or response variable. 
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behavior and labor market outcomes, notably educational attainment and wages (Heckman, Stixrud, 
and Urzua 2006). In addition, we include indicators for self-reported deficiencies in literacy and 
computer skills. We also directly measure the role of experience by supplying a self-reported indicator 
of the worker not having the necessary work experience if looking for a job.  
 
A growing body of evidence in the field of urban economics has alluded to matching as one of 
the main sources of agglomeration economies in cities (Duranton and Puga 2004). Dense labor 
markets improve quality of the match through better diffusion of information and through hosting a 
greater variety of workers and opportunities (Berliant, Reed, and Wang 2006). Our estimates could be 
biased if correlations between urban density, individual search costs, and type of match are ignored. 
Recent research also indicates that it is equally important to account for local composition effects that 
reflect features of the local economy (Combes, Duranton, and Gobillon 2008). In keeping with this 
literature, we use population density to capture differences in agglomeration across regional labor 
markets. 9 To control for regional composition effects, we include industry shares based on four major 
categories, occupational shares on the four major International Standard Classification of Occupations 
(ISCO) categories, the share of the informal sector, the local incidence of mismatch, local 
unemployment rate, and the relative proportions of individuals in the region by skill level. 10 These are 
obtained from within the sample.  
 
A final threat to the internal validity of our results is unobserved differences across cohorts as 
job-finding difficulty and likelihood of matching may systematically vary across age cohorts. One 
possibility is that cohorts face different market conditions upon entering the labor market. Tougher 
economic periods or technological progress over time may influence both search behavior and odds of 
matching by raising requirements for hiring success. To control for this, cohort-within-country fixed 
effects are constructed, spanning individuals in the same 5-year age group in the same country. 
 
We begin the analysis by estimating the likelihood solely on the premise of a human capital 
story. These are compared to the baseline model with proxies for search costs. Thereafter, these 
findings are tested to examine their sensitivity to possible specification error in the model. For all 
estimates, robust standard errors clustered by urban labor market are reported. 
 
B. Results 
 
Table 3 tabulates our estimates from a multinomial logistic regression using our pooled sample. For 
ease of interpretation, coefficients are expressed in terms of relative risk ratios so that a value greater 
than one implies higher odds of obtaining a job for which one is over or underqualified, or being 
unemployed, relative to being well matched, and a value less than one denotes lower associated odds 
of unemployment or over or underqualification relative to being well matched. 
 
In column 1, we estimate a model of worker-job match with country fixed effects and a full set 
of human capital variables. Consistent with a human capital compensation hypothesis (Korpi and 
Tahlin 2009), a deficit in noncognitive skills is found to raise the relative risk of overqualification. 
Meanwhile, the converse scenario is found for the odds of underqualification and unemployment 
where strikingly only higher noncognitive skills possibly substitutes for lack of schooling. 
                                                            
9  Population density for each of the 51 regions was obtained from national statistical agencies for the year closest to the 
date of the survey.  
10  The four major industrial classifications are agriculture, industry, commerce, and other services. The four major 
occupation categories are those categories noted in footnote 4. 
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In this paper, self-reported lack of experience on top of the standard age and squared age 
proxies for work experience are used. Estimates show that this is highly correlated with the type of 
match realized in the labor market with the relative risks of overqualification and unemployment rising 
by a factor of 1.9 and 3.2, or a near doubling and tripling, respectively, and the relative risk of 
underqualification falling by a factor of 0.6 under our baseline specification.  
 
Testing the hypothesis that search costs also determine match quality, we include proxies for 
search difficulty in the model. Column 2 presents estimates from a model with the search variables. 
We begin by examining the relative odds of overqualification. Looking at proxies for search frictions, 
we find that difficulty certifying one’s credentials presents a substantial constraint to appropriate 
worker-job match; relative risk of overqualification rises by a factor of 1.2. Meanwhile barriers to 
accessing information on vacancy and difficulty navigating the job application process are not found to 
be a significant predictor of the likelihood of mismatch, but have signs in the expected direction.  
 
On the other hand, we find that underqualification is negatively related with search difficulties. 
Being adept at navigating the application process and being able to certify one’s skills is associated with 
higher odds of underqualification.  In contrast with earlier results, none of  the search variables or 
socioeconomic variables are significantly correlated with the relative risk of being unemployed.  This is 
likely a unique characteristic of the developing country context where higher search costs could drive 
people into different quality of job matches as opposed to determining differences in unemployment. 
 
In columns 3, 4, and 5, we test whether results are biased by selection on unobservables. First, 
we find that the inclusion of demographic controls only marginally reduce the magnitude of the 
relative risk ratios of our variables of interest, with no change in overall significance. We also find that 
socioeconomic status during one’s youth and parents’ education are an important determinant of 
match type with those from higher-income families and highly educated parents realizing smaller odds 
of overqualification and unemployment and greater odds of being underqualified.  Accounting for 
regional variation across labor markets does not affect the significance of these results. Finally our 
results are also robust to the inclusion of cohort fixed effects. 
 
In simulations, where we examined eliminating search frictions and eliminating potential credit 
and informational constraints associated with socioeconomic status, we found that potential increases 
in the match probability could improve by as much as one-third (Figure 2). Our simulations suggest 
that unemployment potentially rises, consistent with improved allocation of job-worker matches 
resulting in larger shares of workers with higher reservation wages who may be less willing to work in 
the less productive informal sector.  The improved job matches is potentially economically significant 
given the share of mismatches occurring in developing country labor markets and provides support for 
policies that potentially alleviate some of the search frictions that arise due to explicit search 
difficulties and higher search costs that are faced by lower socioeconomic groups.  Nevertheless, it 
may come at the consequence of higher overall unemployment. 
 
Overall, these findings support the theory that in a developing country labor market with 
search frictions, utility-optimizing agents may fail to achieve first best employment outcomes.  From a 
policy perspective, this implies scope for improving the allocation of workers to jobs with potential 
gains not just in wages but also aggregate productivity.  As workers from lower SES are 
disproportionately more likely to be less well matched, improving search frictions could also prove 
fruitful in improving labor market outcomes among the poor. 
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Table 3: Relative Risk Ratio of Education–Job Mismatch, Pooled Sample 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Undereducated  
Years of education 0.834*** [0.0436] 0.808*** [0.0418] 0.802*** [0.0397] 0.797*** [0.0402] 0.792*** [0.0403]
Sex (1 = Female) 0.943 [0.0973] 0.958 [0.0949] 1.000 [0.138] 0.993 [0.129] 0.992 [0.124]
Age 1.009 [0.0397] 1.012 [0.0397] 0.996 [0.0391] 0.996 [0.0389] 1.064 [0.0778]
Lack of experience 0.573*** [0.0520] 0.730*** [0.0461] 0.733*** [0.0338] 0.730*** [0.0426] 0.719*** [0.0453]
Literacy ability 1.049 [0.0518] 1.022 [0.0511] 1.002 [0.0504] 1.010 [0.0460] 1.013 [0.0449]
Noncognitive ability 1.184*** [0.0587] 1.144*** [0.0571] 1.103* [0.0610] 1.108* [0.0639] 1.109** [0.0555]
Difficulty finding vacancy  0.834 [0.102] 0.868 [0.100] 0.892 [0.123] 0.893 [0.126]
Difficulty in app process  0.742*** [0.0702] 0.719*** [0.0589] 0.732*** [0.0763] 0.721*** [0.0714]
Difficulty certifying skills  0.689** [0.123] 0.683* [0.138] 0.665* [0.161] 0.662* [0.162]
Middle SES at age 15  1.073 [0.0872] 1.091 [0.0745] 1.104 [0.0680]
High SES at age 15  0.891 [0.135] 0.879 [0.133] 0.898 [0.146]
Overeducated  
Years of education 1.126*** [0.0209] 1.149*** [0.0139] 1.164*** [0.0189] 1.165*** [0.0201] 1.168*** [0.0208]
Sex (1 = Female) 1.094 [0.0616] 1.087* [0.0514] 1.117** [0.0496] 1.114** [0.0493] 1.116** [0.0497]
Age 1.008 [0.0268] 1.003 [0.0288] 0.988 [0.0231] 0.985 [0.0196] 0.973 [0.0247]
Lack of experience 1.933*** [0.0761] 1.563*** [0.108] 1.528*** [0.117] 1.520*** [0.114] 1.531*** [0.127]
Literacy ability 0.983 [0.0320] 0.993 [0.0337] 1.005 [0.0336] 1.006 [0.0342] 1.004 [0.0312]
Noncognitive ability 0.921*** [0.0240] 0.942* [0.0328] 0.927*** [0.0203] 0.933*** [0.0220] 0.933*** [0.0219]
Difficulty finding vacancy  1.065 [0.0520] 1.067 [0.0543] 1.096 [0.0850] 1.115 [0.0886]
Difficulty in app process  1.477 [0.356] 1.503 [0.393] 1.530* [0.390] 1.517* [0.368]
Difficulty certifying skills  1.176** [0.0753] 1.189*** [0.0705] 1.161* [0.0901] 1.153* [0.0964]
Middle SES at age 15  0.914 [0.119] 0.913 [0.120] 0.906 [0.120]
High SES at age 15  0.723*** [0.0798] 0.711*** [0.0722] 0.705*** [0.0682]
Unemployed 
Years of education 0.992 [0.0331] 0.984 [0.0371] 0.993 [0.0361] 0.993 [0.0354] 0.998 [0.0378]
Sex (1 = Female) 1.124 [0.304] 1.123 [0.300] 1.105 [0.309] 1.090 [0.305] 1.080 [0.304]
Age 0.826*** [0.0610] 0.829** [0.0607] 0.836*** [0.0541] 0.832*** [0.0535] 0.711*** [0.0572]
Lack of experience 3.189*** [0.667] 3.302*** [0.763] 3.338*** [0.762] 3.347*** [0.766] 3.261*** [0.788]
Literacy ability 1.145 [0.0958] 1.138 [0.0954] 1.146 [0.102] 1.140 [0.100] 1.137 [0.102]
continued on next page
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Table 3   continued 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Noncognitive ability 0.903*** [0.0333] 0.900** [0.0385] 0.893*** [0.0391] 0.891*** [0.0379] 0.893*** [0.0368]
Difficulty finding vacancy  0.831 [0.118] 0.838 [0.122] 0.869 [0.143] 0.876 [0.141]
Difficulty in app process  1.269 [0.486] 1.314 [0.541] 1.318 [0.543] 1.339 [0.554]
Difficulty certifying skills  0.777 [0.121] 0.766 [0.133] 0.770 [0.135] 0.775 [0.127]
Middle SES at age 15  1.153 [0.259] 1.155 [0.262] 1.133 [0.247]
High SES at age 15  1.441 [0.332] 1.439 [0.323] 1.387 [0.299]
Other human capital controls YES YES YES YES YES 
Demographic dontrols NO NO YES YES YES 
Regional controls NO NO NO YES YES 
Cohort fixed effects NO NO NO NO YES 
Pseudo R2 0.14 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.16 
Observations (n) 7717 7716 7230 7230 7230 
SES = socioeconomic status, STEP = Skills towards Employability and Productivity. 
Notes: Base outcome is education–job well matched. Relative risk ratios from a MNL regression are reported. Clustered standard errors on country in brackets. All specifications include a constant term. 
Other controls for human capital include squared age, self-reported deficiencies in language and computer skills, and dummies for field of training. Civil status, number of siblings at age 12, indicator for 
being a parent, and dummies for parents’ maximum educational attainment comprise the demographic controls. Regional controls include population density, incidence of informal employment, 
occupational structure (shares of high-skill white collar, low-skill white collar, and crafts and related trade), economic structure (shares of agriculture, industry, and commerce), and education structure 
(shares of those with postsecondary education and secondary education).   Cohort fixed effects are dummies of five year cohorts. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Source: Authors’ estimates based on World Bank STEP surveys. 
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Figure 2: Actual and Simulated Incidence of Match Outcomes 
 
 
 
SES = socioeconomic status, STEP = Skills towards Employability and Productivity. 
Source: Authors’ estimates based on World Bank STEP surveys. 
 
 
IV. QUALIFICATION MISMATCH AND WAGES 
 
A. Wage Consequences of Mismatch 
 
Relative to otherwise similar candidates, job seekers facing nontrivial barriers to search are less likely to 
secure positions for which they are matched. From a wage perspective, it may be possible to quantify 
the welfare improvements from reducing search costs.  This literature has consistently found that the 
overqualified earn more than workers in the same occupation but make less than those in the job 
appropriate to their schooling level. Conversely, the underqualified are paid less than workers in the 
same occupation but make more than similarly educated workers in the job matched to their 
credentials (Leuven and Oosterbeek 2011). This wage differential may be regarded as the potential 
gains from improving allocation of labor. In general, the wage differential can be explained through the 
marginal productivity that an individual obtains in their respective jobs. 
 
This section primarily tests whether search heterogeneity across individuals explain wage 
differentials among workers of different match outcomes.  If the proxies for search only matter to the 
match outcome and not wages, then the welfare improvements from reducing search costs will be 
through reallocation rather than through broader adjustments in employment practices. The 
workhorse wage model of the mismatch literature, can be traced to the work of Duncan and Hoffman 
(1981). They extend the traditional Mincerian wage equation, decomposing years of schooling 
acquired 	ܵ௔  into three components: years of schooling required for the job ܵ௥ , years of 
overqualification 	ܵ௢, and years of underqualification 	ܵ௨. This results to the following identity: 
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௜ܵ௔ ≡ 	 ௜ܵ௥ ൅ ௜ܵ௢ െ ௜ܵ௨ 
 
The wage model can be expressed as: 
 
ݕ௜ ൌ 	ߚ௥ ௜ܵ௥ ൅ ߚ௢ ௜ܵ௢ ൅ ߚ௨ ௜ܵ௨ ൅ ߩ ௜ܺ ൅ ߝ௜  
 
where ݕ௜  denotes the logarithm of hourly wages and  ௜ܺ  is a vector of explanatory variables such as age, 
age squared, and gender, including a constant. The success of the model can be credited to its ease of 
interpretation in terms of several labor market theories. First, standard human capital theory posits that 
employers fully utilize worker’s skills so that only the amount of attained education matters to earnings. 
Empirically, this is equivalent to the joint equality of schooling returns, βR=βO=βU. In contrast, Thurow’s 
(1975) job competition model proposes a labor market in which earnings are not determined by 
worker’s skills or productivity but solely by the requirements of the job (βO=βU=0). Education only 
serves to rank workers in order of trainability but does not affect wage outcomes. The empirical 
regularity that overeducated suffer wage penalties (βR>βO≥0) and undereducated enjoy wage premia 
(βU≤0) relative to individuals with similar education suggests that a more realistic model is one in 
which wages are jointly determined by both worker and job characteristics (Sattinger 1993, Hartog 
1986). 
 
B.  Results 
 
Table 4 presents our estimates of the relationship between wages and years of schooling from the 
pooled sample. The first column contains regression estimates from a standard overeducation–
required–undereducation specification with gender, age, and age squared as added explanatory 
variables. The signs and magnitudes of the coefficients of years required, years of overqualification, 
and years of underqualification are consistent with findings in the literature.  
 
The coefficients of interest on the returns to years required and years under or over qualified 
may still suffer from bias due to unobserved skill heterogeneity among workers and omitted 
characteristics of the job.  To examine the role of latent ability and job characteristics, we include a 
vector of human capital and sector of employment controls that likely determine worker productivity. 
This includes measures of tenure, cognitive and noncognitive skills, as well as indicator variables for 
self-reported deficiencies in literacy, computer skills, and experience. In addition, we supply dummies 
for an index of firm size, informal sector, self-employment, private and public sector wage work. 
Industry fixed effects are also included. 
 
Unlike previous studies, we are able to observe the task content of the job, which Autor and 
Handel (2013) have shown to be a crucial determinant of earnings outcomes. Tasks performed on the 
job are simultaneously determined by job demands and worker characteristics that provide 
comparative advantage in executing certain tasks. From the results in column 2, we find that 
accounting for heterogeneity along these dimensions reduces the coefficients of years of 
overqualification and underqualification by as much as 25%, with the explanatory power driven largely 
by the inclusion of the task variables.  Because these task variables are the outcome of both supply and 
demand factors, it is difficult to draw conclusive interpretations. A first possibility is that tasks 
represent units of productivity delivered by the worker such that the rewards (penalties) incurred by 
overqualified (underqualified) workers relative to well matched individuals in the same job are an 
artifact of surplus (deficit) of productivity. The remaining unexplained differential could be explained 
by unmeasured task components. An alternative explanation is that the remaining differential is 
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correlated with other unobservable components that place maximum bounds on potential 
productivity that could occur and are related to the firm such as management practices and ability of 
manager or firm to identify, recruit and utilize certain skills. If this is the case, reallocation of better 
workers into jobs could have more minimal effects on improved productivity. 
 
Table 4: Wages, Search, and Years of Mismatch Schooling, Pooled Sample 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Years required 0.0834*** 0.0583*** 0.0789*** 0.0589*** 0.0635***
 [0.00289] [0.00461] [0.00392] [0.00523] [0.00641]
Years overeducated 0.0473*** 0.0339*** 0.0447*** 0.0349*** 0.0351***
 [0.00560] [0.00470] [0.00596] [0.00444] [0.00324]
Years undereducated –0.0412*** –0.0266** –0.0383*** –0.0268** –0.0290**
 [0.00682] [0.00978] [0.00741] [0.0101] [0.00996]
Difficulty finding vacancy 0.0336 0.0325 0.0286
 [0.0325] [0.0424] [0.0426]
Difficulty in app process –0.0186 0.0432 0.0557
 [0.0443] [0.0374] [0.0306]
Difficulty certifying skills –0.0477 –0.00763 –0.0179
 [0.0523] [0.0467] [0.0450]
Indicator for middle SES at15 0.0515 0.0388 0.0296
 [0.0271] [0.0323] [0.0401]
Indicator for high SES at 15 0.157** 0.130** 0.115**
 [0.0433] [0.0370] [0.0421]
Country fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES
Age and gender controls YES YES YES YES YES
Human capital controls NO YES NO YES YES
Job characteristic controls NO YES NO YES YES
Demographic controls NO NO NO NO YES
F(Search costs)  0.47 1.48 1.85
p-value  0.72 0.33 0.26
F(SES at age 15)  8.25 16.14 20.25
p-value   0.03 0.01 0.00
Adjusted R2 0.15 0.19 0.15 0.19 0.20
SES = socioeconomic status, STEP = Skills towards Employability and Productivity. 
Notes: The dependent variable in all columns is log hourly wages in PPP. All models include a constant and are weighted by sampling weights. 
Standard errors in brackets are clustered on country (6 categories). Human capital controls include tenure, cognitive reading and 
noncognitive skills and an indicator for self-reported deficiency in experience, literacy, and computer skills. Controls for job characteristics 
include industry fixed effects, dummy for the size of the firm, dummy for self-employed, dummy for informal sector, dummy for private sector 
wageworker, and dummy for public sector wageworker, and scores for analytical, interpersonal, routine, and manual task intensities following 
Autor and Handel (2013). Demographic controls include dummies for having spouse and children, indicators for the maximum level of 
parents’ education.  
Source: Authors’ estimates based on World Bank STEP surveys. 
 
If search costs potentially have more direct ramifications on wages, this could alter the wage 
distribution beyond the improved allocation of worker-job matches. This could occur if individual 
heterogeneities in search difficulties potentially are a direct reflection of an individual’s unobserved 
skill and productivity outside of selection into match quality and our observable job characteristics and 
human capital controls. In columns 3–5 of Table 4, we include our variables for search difficulties.  We 
find that none of the proxies for search cost significantly correlate with wages after including indicators 
for worker-job qualification match quality.  Moreover, the specification combining these variables of 
search costs with our controls for human capital and job characteristic only marginally changes the 
significance of the coefficients between columns 1 and 3. However, when we include a full set of 
controls, the estimates are somewhat higher in absolute value compared to a model with only human 
capital, demographic, and job variables.  This suggests that individual welfare gains from a reduction in 
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search costs will arise almost entirely from the wage restitution and productivity gains from 
transitioning into jobs that are more appropriate to an individual’s ability (Kampelmann and Rycx 
2012). Nevertheless, the set of welfare-improving reallocation will however be limited by the available 
jobs in the labor market.  
 
A major question is whether the wage consequences to mismatch differ among different 
economies. Table 5 presents results from the country wage regressions.  These reveal differing patterns 
among different economies.  In the Lao PDR where there is a high share of informal employment and 
more limited share with a tertiary degree, there is no penalty in wages from overqualification and no 
penalty to underqualification compared to what is required. In Sri Lanka, there is no significant benefit 
to higher education with workers essentially being paid exactly the amount required by the occupation.  
Almost all other economies face some penalties in wages for each additional year of overqualification 
with payoffs that are between one-quarter and one-half of what they would have obtained from 
entering a job for which they are well matched. These regressions also indicate that search costs and 
demographics do not explain any of the estimated returns to required schooling and suggest that there 
could be gains to reducing search frictions and credit constraints in all economies through improved 
allocation of labor. 
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Table 5: Relationship between Wages and Years of Mismatch Schooling, Country Samples 
 
 Armenia PRC (Yunnan) Georgia 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
SR 0.0434*** 0.0385*** 0.0382*** 0.0476*** 0.0760*** 0.0553*** 0.0775*** 0.0539*** 0.114*** 0.0396*** 0.0960*** 0.0438***
 [0.00870] [0.0127] [0.00995] [0.0136] [0.00748] [0.0105] [0.00889] [0.0108] [0.0119] [0.0143] [0.0137] [0.0168]
SO 0.0327** 0.0267* 0.0293* 0.0305* 0.0594*** 0.0354*** 0.0632*** 0.0382*** 0.0607*** 0.0272* 0.0498*** 0.0281
 [0.0140] [0.0152] [0.0149] [0.0165] [0.0114] [0.0120] [0.0120] [0.0121] [0.0153] [0.0162] [0.0160] [0.0177]
SU 0.0134 0.0164 0.0140 –0.00130 –0.0240 –0.0148 –0.0258 –0.0157 –0.092*** –0.069*** –0.082*** –0.0621**
 [0.0206] [0.0226] [0.0205] [0.0213] [0.0176] [0.0164] [0.0172] [0.0162] [0.0301] [0.0252] [0.0298] [0.0253]
F(Search costs)   0.88 1.02 0.86 0.55 2.72 1.24
p-value   0.45 0.38 0.46 0.65 0.04 0.29
Adjusted R2 0.113 0.135 0.117 0.111 0.118 0.240 0.129 0.245 0.225 0.311 0.233 0.276
 Lao PDR Sri Lanka Viet Nam 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
SR 0.0631*** 0.0179 0.0417*** 0.0261 0.109*** 0.0718*** 0.117*** 0.0784*** 0.0903*** 0.0695*** 0.0857*** 0.0674***
 [0.0101] [0.0182] [0.0148] [0.0198] [0.0138] [0.0245] [0.0159] [0.0254] [0.00678] [0.0116] [0.00921] [0.0116]
SO 0.0661*** 0.0423* 0.0530** 0.0406 0.0400 0.0199 0.0491 0.0283 0.0460*** 0.0347*** 0.0435*** 0.0314**
 [0.0189] [0.0227] [0.0210] [0.0250] [0.0361] [0.0378] [0.0389] [0.0402] [0.0121] [0.0125] [0.0133] [0.0135]
SU 0.0109 0.0410* 0.0304 0.0299 –0.0641* –0.0286 –0.0601* –0.0296 –0.049*** –0.042*** –0.046*** –0.0371**
 [0.0246] [0.0244] [0.0239] [0.0256] [0.0347] [0.0334] [0.0330] [0.0309] [0.0136] [0.0156] [0.0133] [0.0147]
F(Search costs)   3.84 1.05 1.25 1.64 1.50 1.23
p-value   0.01 0.37 0.29 0.18 0.21 0.30
Adjusted R2 0.116 0.200 0.136 0.177 0.153 0.219 0.150 0.218 0.151 0.187 0.153 0.183
Lao PDR = Lao People’s Democratic Republic, PRC = People’s Republic of China, STEP = Skills towards Employability and Productivity. 
Notes: The dependent variable in all columns is log hourly wages in local currency. We report only OLS estimates for years of required education, years of overeducation and years of undereducation. All 
models include a constant and are weighted by sampling weights. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in brackets. Column 1 has age, age squared, and gender as additional explanatory variables. 
Column 2 extends this to include human capital as well as job characteristic controls. Column 3 adds our proxies for search impediments to the basic column 1 specification, while column 4 corresponds to a 
specification with search variables as well as controls for human capital and job characteristics. 
Source: Authors’ estimates based on World Bank STEP surveys. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
 
Evidence of cross-country qualification mismatch demonstrates that overqualification is even more 
pervasive in developing Asia than in advanced economies such as the US and other members of the 
OECD. However, the prevalence of over qualification relative to job requirements masks 
heterogeneities in skills, jobs, and labor market institutions.  Nevertheless we find no evidence to 
support the idea that current skills are insufficient to meet the demands of the existing labor market.  
To date, there has been little literature which demonstrates that individual mismatch has ramifications 
on aggregate productivity or that the current allocation of workers is suboptimal.  We make advances 
on the latter by empirically establishing the link between search costs and mismatches in the labor 
market in developing countries.  
 
From a policy perspective, our findings indicate scope for a concerted policy response in 
reducing impediments to search and alleviating credit constraints. Both of these are potentially a far 
more pressing issue in labor markets in developing countries. This is because in the absence of 
unemployment insurance, credit constraints, and higher search costs among the poor can result in 
them more immediately entering jobs for which they are less well matched.  This is further exacerbated 
by the greater absence of easy access to information that is often facilitated through employment 
service websites and credible skill certification programs that would provide a clearer signal of an 
individual’s ability. The significance of both search costs and socioeconomic status in determining 
mismatch underscores the potential and economically significant role of reducing impediments to 
search among the poorer population set. This can ultimately help improve the allocation of labor that 
leads to gains in average wages and productivity. 
 
Potential policy responses could include small subsidies or incentives targeted at poor, 
unemployed workers, which reduces search costs and has been shown to effectively raise the intensity 
of job search both in developed and developing countries (Bryan, Chowdhury, and Mobarak 2014; 
Philips 2014; Franklin 2015). Field experimental evidence has also shown that greater access to 
information on vacancies (Dammert, Galdo, and Galdo 2015), provision of career guidance (Behagel,  
Crépon, and Gurgand 2014), and other active labor market policy interventions (Card, Kluve, Weber 
2010) positively affect job-finding rates. Nevertheless, it should be recognized that these programs 
could have displacement effects, making it harder for noneligible workers to potentially find jobs and 
may not necessarily justify them as publicly efficient investment (Crépon et al. 2013. Moreover, 
potential preferences for certain unobserved job types that are not well matched to any jobs that are 
available could limit developing better matches in the first place (Groh et al. 2015). Embarking on 
similar studies looking into the failures behind mismatches and full effects of policy interventions 
would provide a way forward for the literature.  
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